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NOTE
POSSESSORY LIENS: THE NEED FOR SEPARATE DUE
PROCESS ANALYSIS
Following the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in Sniadach v. Fam-
ily Finance Corp.,1 lower courts faced a wave of debtors' rights cases
challenging the constitutionality of long-established creditors' rem-
edies. Hesitant to expand the due process requirements newly ap-
plied in protection of the debtor, some courts confined the require-
ments of notice and hearing to circumstances which could "drive a
wage earning family to the wall;"'2 other courts, eager to increase
debtor protection, invalidated numerous creditors' remedies.3 The
1. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Sniadach's wages had been garnished pursuant to a Wisconsin
statute allowing garnishment or attachment upon the creditor's bare assertion of a default
in loan repayment; she based her motion to dismiss the garnishment on the proposition that
the fourteenth amendment clearly states that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Sustaining the trial court's denial of the
motion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that the minimal nature of the deprivation,
the opportunity for early attack, the available remedies for improper garnishment, and histor-
ical antecedents of the procedure defeated the applicability of the fourteenth amendment.
Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259 (1967). The United States
Supreme Court preferred Sniadach's simple logic and reversed, holding that the Wisconsin
garnishment procedure violated due process because it did not provide for notice and a
hearing before the deprivation. 395 U.S. at 340-42. The creditor had "met the Constitution."
See Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution,
59 VA. L. Rnv. 355 (1973).
2. 395 U.S. at 341-42. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir.
1970)(replevin); Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasibg & Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972) (foreign attachment of bank account); Epps v. Cortese, 326
F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)(replevin);
Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971)(attachment of residence,
no deprivation of use); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla.) (posses-
ion); Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970) (wage garnishment); American Olean
Tile Co. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970) (garnishment of corporate bank
account and accounts receivable); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970) (power
of sale under deed of trust); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla.
1970), rev'd sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)(replevin); Andrew Brown Co. v
Painters Warehouse, Inc., 11 Ariz. App. 571, 466 P.2d 790 (1970)(garnishment of accounts
receivable); Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. Cir. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (1969)(attachment
of checking account); Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154 (Dist. Ct. App.
Fla. 1970)(attachment).
3. See, eg., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970)(landlord's lien statute); Adams
v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern Cal. First
Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 324 (1974)(repossession); Collins
v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (innkeeper's lien); Santiago v.
McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970)(distraint); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co.,
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nonanalytic approach of the courts clearly reflected that division of
attitudes toward the new due process for debtors: whatever the
holding, the rationale was often a mere citation of favorable
precedent,4 systematically omitting an analysis of the challenged
creditor's remedy in relation to the evolving debtor due process
requirements.
Although three years after Sniadach, the Supreme Court seemed
to confirm in sweeping terms the expansion of debtor protections in
Fuentes v. Shevin,5 the Court more recently injected confusion into
the field of debtor-creditor law in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.' De-
spite the involvement of a procedure resembling that in Fuentes,7
315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970)(replevin); Kim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970)(innkeeper's lien); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 191
(1972) (confession of judgment); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96
Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972) (attachment); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.
3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971) (claim and delivery); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor
Travel Servs., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970) (garnishment of accounts receiva-
ble); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969).
4. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); McCormick v.
First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
5. 407 U.S. 67 (1972), rev'g Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), and
Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The Florida statute, [1967] Fla. Laws
ch. 67-254, § 28 (amended 1973) (now FRA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01, 78.071, 78.075, 78.08 (Supp.
1974-75)), authorized issuance of a writ of replevin to a creditor who posted bond for twice
the value of the property upon his assertion that he was entitled to possession. In Pennsyl-
vania the writ issued upon an "affidavit of the value of the property to be replevied." PA.
STAT. ANr. tit. 12, §§ 1073(a), 1976 (1967). In both states a clerk issued the writ, without
judicial participation. The sheriff then had the duty to seize the property and sequester it
for a period during which the debtor might post a counter bond and reacquire the property.
If the debtor failed to post a bond, the creditor acquired the property. In Florida application
for a writ was required to accompany filing on the merits; since Pennsylvania had no such
requirement, the debtor bore responsibility for initiating an action.
Although Sniadach had been interpreted as requiring due process only in circumstances
driving wager earners "to the wall," see note 2 supra, Fuentes rejected the notion that due
process requirements embraced only necessaries, clarifying that any significant taking of
property, however temporary, would trigger due process requirements. 407 U.S. at 80-82. The
notion that remedies for wrongful deprivation would suffice similarly was rejected. Id. at 82.
Perhaps most significant for the emerging debtor-creditor due process law, possession and
continued use were found to be constitutionally cognizable interests. Id. at 84-85.
6. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974). Louisiana's Code of Civil Procedure allowed a mortgage or lien
holder a writ of sequestration to forestall waste or alienation of the encumbered property. The
writ was obtainable on the creditor's ex parte application without notice to the debtor or an
opportunity for a hearing. In the parish from which the case arose, the writ would issue only
upon a verified affidavit and a judge's authority after the filing of a sufficient bond by the
creditor. The debtor could seek dissolution, which was required unless the creditor proved
grounds for issuance: existence of the debt, lien, and delinquency. Id. at 1899. Cf notes 53-
63 infra & accompanying text.
7. Speaking for three dissenting Justices, Justice Stewart noted that the Louisiana proce-
dure was "remarkably similar to the statutory provisions at issue in Fuentes v. Shevin." 94
S. Ct. at 1910.
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the Mitchell decision upheld a Louisiana lien law as a constitution-
ally sufficient accommodation of competing interests, 8 while the
Fuentes decision had invalidated Florida and Pennsylvania replevin
statutes for failure to provide due process to debtors. Whatever the
ultimate effect of the Mitchell decision on debtor-creditor law, it has
forced a needed reevaluation,9 for, in the rush to rescue debtors,
courts had neglected to consider distinctions among the various
creditors' remedies.10 These distinctions should determine the
applicability of due process requirements.
One creditors' remedy with potentially significant unique charac-
teristics is the possessory lien. Typically arising in favor of bailees
who "add to" the liened chattel or in favor of others charged with a
special duty," possessory liens often involve an initial voluntary
surrender of possession by the chattel owner 12 and operate extra-
judicially.1 3 Because these characteristics may distinguish a posses-
sory lien from creditors' remedies that involve outright seizure, and
because different possessory liens may differ in their operation, sep-
arate analyses of the applicability of due process requirements to
different liens may contribute stability and predictability to debtor-
creditor law. These characteristics of possessory liens must be
judged against the historical, contemporary, and evolving legal
standards against which creditors' remedies generally must be eval-
uated.
ANTECEDENTS OF THE MODERN LIFN-THE HISTORICAL TEST
Courts often have cited well-established common law antecedents
among proffered reasons for sustaining the constitutionality of sum-
8. Id. at 1900.
9. Further confusion and further need for evaluation has resulted from the Court's recent
decision finding a lack of appropriate due process provisions in a Georgia garnishment stat-
ute, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975). See notes 64-66 infra
& accompanying text.
10. Quebec v. Bud's Auto Serv., 32 Cal. App. 3d 257, 105 Cal. Rptr. 677 (Super. Ct. 1973)
(rehearing granted), provides an example of a court's failure to note distinctions among the
various creditors' remedies; the court merely analogized to seizure cases in invalidating a
garageman's lien. The aid which Quebec offered the debtor was short lived, however, since
Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145
(1974), validated interim retention provisions. See notes 97-101 infra & accompanying text.
11. See notes 25-26 infra & accompanying text.
12. See note 31 infra.
13. See notes 117-22 infra & accompanying text.
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mary creditors' remedies," thereby advancing a historical test for
judging the validity of longstanding procedures.'" Their inquiries
frequently focus upon the mere pedigree of the procedure and ignore
the evolution of the essential elements of the .remedy vis-a-vis con-
current legal developments. The exact historical origin of the pos-
sessory lien is disputed," but its different antecedents provide the
basis for an evaluation of its purpose within the legal system.
Although case law often ascribes the first possessory liens to the
public callings which were bound by law to serve all comers,'" at
least one authority 8 traces the derivation to the failure of early
common law to provide an action of implied contract, arguing that
early courts devised the possessory lien to provide relief for those
who had performed services on the goods of another but were pre-
cluded from suing for the reasonable value of their services." Both
theories reflect cured infirmities of the legal system; yet the remedy
has been preserved, nourished, and expanded long after the problem
disappeared.2 1 Under the "public callings" theory, persons such as
14. See, e.g., Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974); Adams v. Southern
Cal. First Nat'1 Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974); Kruger v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974); Messengerv. Sandy
Motors, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (Super. Ct. 1972).
15. The logic of the historical test seems to be: "The lien is valid because it has always
been valid." Such an approach clearly avoids the question of debtors' due process rights.
16. For a more detailed analysis of the history of various creditors' remedies, see Country-
man, The Bill of Rights and the Bill Collector, 15 Auz. L. REv. 521 (1973).
17. The Supreme Court of Iowa has expressed this approach: "At common law an
innkeeper entitled to a lien was one who held out his place as one for the entertainment of
all respectable transient persons who chose to come to him. The lien was given largely because
of his so holding himself out and his consequent duty to entertain all transients or travelers
who offered themselves as guests." Cedar Rapids Inv. Co. v. Commodore Hotel Co., 205 Iowa
736, 218 N.W. 510, 511 (1928). See also W.C. Caye & Co. v. Milledgeville Banking Co., 91
Ga. App. 664, 86 S.E.2d 717 (1955); A.G. Graben Motor Co. v. Brown Garage Co., 197 Iowa
453, 195 N.W. 752 (1923); Halsey v. Svitak, 163 Minn. 253, 203 N.W. 968 (1925); George v.
Walton, 36 Ohio L. Abs. 306, 43 N.E.2d 515 (Ct. App. 1942); Cook v. Prentice, 13 Ore. 482,
11 P. 226 (1886); Shaw v. Webb, 131 Tenn. 173, 174 S.W. 273 (1915).
18. R. BROWN, Tim LAW OF PERSONAL PRoPERTY § 107, at 510 (2d ed. 1955).
19. Another commentator suggests that liens first may have been granted to ease the rigors
of the constructive condition precedent of contract law. Williams, Creditors' Prejudgment
Remedies: Expanding Strictures on Traditional Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 60, 88 (1972). The
tradesman whose performance necessarily extended over a period of time was required to
perform completely before becoming entitled to payment. RTAsEmENT OF CoNMACTS § 270
(1932). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONMACTS § 259(2) (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1973).
20. Professor Countryman has noted: "Many of these creditors' remedies - and, in partic-
ular, many of the prejudgment remedies-find their antecedents in English practices. This
in itself is not surprising. But many of these English practices date back to a very early and,
from the debtor's viewpoint, rigorous time, and some of them we have continued to nourish
long after they were abandoned by the English." Countryman, supra note 16, at 521.
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innkeepers were given a lien on guests' property for reasonable
charges because of the high duty of care imposed upon them.21 That
absolute duty of care has been abrogated,22 but the lien has survived
and has been expanded. For example, when the action of assumpsit
became available for contracts implied in fact, courts preserved the
creditor's possessory lien although the remedy was now severed from
the evil it was instituted to correct.2 3 Therefore, whichever theory
justified its creation, the possessory lien outlived its initial justifica-
tion, and its continded validity depends upon whether it can fulfill
a contemporary legal need.24
Not only does the possessory lien appear to be an ancient remedy
searching for a present problem, but statutes systematically have
altered its essential features. At common law a bailee was granted
a lien only if he was engaged in one of the several public callings
upon which the law imposed special responsibility,2 or if he had
improved or increased the value of the bailed chattel by his labor.26
In many jurisdictions, present statutes entitle additional classes of
bailees to perfect a possessory lien,27 and alter the substantive provi-
21. R. BROWN, supra note 18, § 107, at 510. See note 17 supra.
22. For a historical analysis leading to abrogation, see Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109,
118-20 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See also Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 22 n.6,
300 N.E.2d 710, 715 n.6, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 177 n.6 (1973).
23. R. BRowN, supra note 18, § 107, at 510. Indeed, in 1816 the lien was extended to services
performed by tradesmen under express contracts. Chase v. Westmore, 105 Eng. Rep. 1016
(K.B. 1816). In Chase Lord Ellenborough characterized authorities upholding the distinction
between express and implied contracts for services as "contrary to reason and to the principles
of law." Id. at 1018. He failed to recognize that the roots of the lien he expanded long since
had been eradicated.
24. In discussing one closely related self-help remedy, one commentator concluded:
That normal legal growth must be fatal to the remedy of distress is apparent.
It is not only extrajudicial; it is strictly anti-social and anti-legal. It is opposed
to fundamental legal conceptions. It can never be tolerated that a man should
at the same time be both judge and executive officer in his own behalf. .. If
a system of law fully adapted to the capacity and purpose of man could come
into existence without regard to antecedent conditions, distress would have no
place in it. Legal evolution tends to bring all procedure into the category of legal
process, and thus to eliminate self-help altogether. We, therefore, see early law
gradually and surely disentangling itself from the meshes of this primitive insti-
tution.
3 T. STRE, THE FouNDATIoNs OF LEGAL LuBmmrr 285-86 (1906).
25. See note 17 supra.
26. See, eg.,,Clark Bros. & Co. v. Pou, 20 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1927); Moynihan Associates,
Inc. v. Haniseh, 56 Wis. 2d 185, 201 N.W.2d 534 (1972).
27. See generally L. JONES, TiM LAW OF LIENs 93-104 (3d ed. 1914). For example, at com-
mon law only common carriers, not private carriers, were granted a lien for reasonable freight
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sions of the lien. Statutes generally provide three forms of posses-
sory liens. They grant a lien to repairmen or improvers such as
artisans, craftsmen, or mechanics who actually perform work on a
specific chattel.3 Statutory provisions also assist holders of goods
such as warehousemen, carriers, or others who are given possession
of a chattel for storage or transportation.2s Finally, the ancient com-
mon law lien survives in statutes giving, innkeepers a lien on
boarders' property, including goods which have not been placed
charges. Statutes in some jurisdictions now extend the right to a lien to private carriers. See
Gulf Motor Lines, Inc. v. European Agencies, Inc., 155 So. 523 (La. App. 1934). Common law
did not authorize a lien on behalf of the proprietor of a boarding, lodging, or rooming house.
See Halsey v. Svitak, 163 Minn. 253, 203 N.W. 968 (1925); Nance v. O.K. Houck Piano Co.,
128 Tenn. 1, 155 S.W. 1172 (1913). Most state statutes award such a lien to these proprietors.
See, e.g., Nicholas v. Baldwin Piano Co., 71 Ind. App. 209, 123 N.E. 226 (1919); Cedar Rapids
Inv. Co. v. Commodore Hotel Co., 205 Iowa 736, 218 N.W. 510 (1928); Friedrich Music House
v. Harris, 200 Mich. 421, 166 N.W. 869 (1918); Halsey v. Svitak, 163 Minn. 253, 203 N.W.
968 (1925); McClain v. Williams, 11 S.D. 227, 76 N.W. 930 (1898); Nance v. O.K. Houck
Piano Co., 128 Tenn. 1, 155 S.W. 172 (1913); Fudge v. Downing, 83 Utah 101, 27 P.2d 33
(1933); Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v. Hotel Stevens Co., 38 Wash. 409, 80 P. 563 (1905).
28. For example, the New York statute provides: "A person who makes, alters, repairs or
performs work or services of any nature and description upon, or in any way enhances the
value of an article of personal property, at the request or with the consent of the owner, has
a lien on such article, while lawfully in possession thereof, for his reasonable charges for the
work done and materials furnished, and may retain possession thereof until such charges are
paid." N.Y. LmN LAW § 180 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
The New Jersey statute provides:
A garage keeper who shall store, maintain, keep or repair a motor vehicle or
furnish gasoline, accessories or other supplies therefor, at the request or with the
consent of the owner or his representative, shall have a lien upon the motor
vehicle or any part thereof for the sum due for such storing, maintaining, keep-
ing or repairing of such motor vehicle or for furnishing gasoline, accessories or
other supplies therefor, and may, without process of law, detain the same at any
time it is lawfully in his possession until the sum is paid."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44-21 (Supp. 1974).
29. The Uniform Commercial Code provides: "A warehouseman has a lien against the
bailor on the goods covered by a warehouse receipt or on the proceeds thereof in his possession
for charges for storage or transportation (including demurrage and terminal charges), insur-
ance, labor, or charges present or future in relation to the goods, and for expenses necessary
for preservation of the goods or reasonably incurred in their sale pursuant to law." UNIFoRM
Com.nc C D § 7-209(1). The Code also provides: "A carrier has a lien on the goods
covered by a bill of lading for charges subsequent to the date of its receipt of the goods for
storage or transportation (including demurrage and terminal charges) and for expenses neces-
sary for preservation of the goods incident to their transportation or reasonably incurred in
their sale pursuant to law. But against a purchaser for value of a negotiable bill of lading a
carrier's lien is limited to charges stated in the bill or the applicable tariffs, or if no charges
are stated then to a reasonable charge." Id. § 7-307(1). See also N.J. STAT. AmN. § 2A:44-21
(Supp. 1974).
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specifically in the possession of the innkeeper. 30
Whereas the common law founded the lien on the bailee's contin-
ued possession," a statutory lien may remain valid after the surren-
der of possession, 2 often on the condition that the lienor file the lien
30. The Illinois statute protects the innkeeper by providing: "Hotel, inn and boarding
house keepers shall have a lien upon the baggage and other valuables of their guests or
boarders brought into such hotel, inn or boarding house by such guests or boarders, for the
proper charges due from such guests or boarders for their accommodations, board and lodg-
ings and such extras as are furnished at their request." ILamos ANN. STAT. ch. 82, § 57
(Smith-Hurd 1966). Similarly, the New York statute provides: "A keeper of a hotel, apart-
ment hotel, inn, boarding house, rooming house or lodging house.., has a lien upon, while
in possession, and may detain the baggage and other property brought upon his premises by
a guest, boarder, roomer or lodger, for the proper charges due him, on account of his accom-
modation, board, room and lodging, and such extras as are furnished at his request." N.Y.
LIEN LAW § 181 (McKinney 1966).
Similar rights in tenants' chattels are often given landlords: "A landlord or his duly author-
ized agent may, for arrears of rent, distrain: a) the goods and chattels of his tenant, found
upon the demised premises, except such as are by law exempt from distraint and except the
goods and chattels of another in possession of the tenant." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:33-6 (1952)
(this remedy is not available against residential tenants, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:33-1 (Supp.
1974)).
31. At common law possessory liens were of two types: the specific lien attached to a chattel
for the indebtedness incurred from service upon the particular chattel only, while the general
lien attached to the chattel for the indebtedness from the general account between the
parties. See R. BRowN, supra note 18, § 107, at 511. Although the breadth of the lien varied,
its foundation was set firmly in possession. See, Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 1322 (1961); Annot., 25
A.L.R.2d 1037 (1952).
The term "lien" has been variously defined. It has been used indiscriminately to describe
any special interest one may have in personalty or realty, the general property ownership of
which is in another. See Major Appliance Co. v. Gibson Refrig. Sales Corp., 254 F.2d 497 (5th
Cir. 1958).
At common law, the lien was a right "in one man to retain that which is in his possession
belonging to another, till certain demands of him the person in possession are satisfied."
Hammonds v. Barclay, 102 Eng. Rep. 356, 359 (K.B. 1802) (emphasis supplied). Possession
was in the creditor-lienor although ownership remained in the debtor. Notwithstanding the
value of the improvement wrought by his labor, the laborer had no common law lien unless
he retained possession of the improved chattel; for example, one who made repairs on a
locomotive which remained on the tracks of its owner was denied the lien. See Burdick v.
Marshall, 8 S.D. 308, 66 N.W. 462 (1896).
A lien is both a proprietary interest, see, e.g., City of Sanford v. McClelland, 121 Fie. 253,
163 So. 513 (1935); Dysart v. State Dep't of Public Health & Welfare, 361 S.W.2d 347 (Mo.
App. 1962); Williamson v. Winningham, 199 Okla. 393, 186 P.2d 644 (1947); Swanson v.
Graham, 27 Wash. 2d 590, 179 P.2d 288 (1947), and a property right of sorts, see Young v.
J.A. Young Mach. & Supply Co., 203 Okla. 595, 224 P.2d 971 (1950), although it does not
transfer title, see Sullivan v. Wellborn, 32 Cal. 2d 214, 195 P.2d 787 (1948); Foelor v. Wor-
thington, 13 Colo. 559, 22 P. 960 (1889); Mills v. Reneau, 411 P.2d 516 (Okla. 1965). It is
simply a right of the person in possession to retain that which is in his possession until certain
of his demands are satisfied. Smyth v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 326 Pa. 391, 192 A. 640 (1937);
Potter v. Foster, 16 Tenn. App. 324, 64 S.W.2d 520 (1932).
32. See, e.g., Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Phillips, 118 Mich. 162, 76 N.W. 371 (1898) (corporation
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pursuant to statute.s Some statutes have modified the common law
requirement of uninterrupted possession 4 and under these statutes
periodic use by the owner will not defeat the lien. 5 Today a statu-
tory lien may supersede even the bailee's right to retain possession
and allow a bailor to recover possession despite the lien. 8 Finally,
the scope of the common law lien extended the rights of the lienor
no further than detention until payment;37 unless a power of sale
was conferred by special agreement, the lienor could not lawfully
sell the property to obtain reimbursement. 8 Under the statutes of
various jurisdictions, however, provisions for sale have been added.39
In many instances, therefore, the creditors' remedy which sur-
vives judicial scrutiny partially on the strength of its longstanding
existence shows little resemblance to its common law ancestor. 0 In
light of these changes, it is necessary to reassess today's possessory
lien and measure it against a more appropriate standard. In recent
had statutorily created lien on stock of shareholder-debtor though not in possession of the
stock).
33. See, e.g., Olson v. Orr, 94 Kan. 38, 145 P. 900 (1915); Hiner v. Pitts, 89 Ore. 602, 175
P. 133 (1918).
34. At common law, the lien claimant not only must be in actual physical possession, but
he also must have the right to continue this exclusive possession without interruption. See,
e.g., Sears v. Wills, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 108 (1861); Lathrop Lumber Co. v. Fitts, 208 Ala. 334,
94 So. 354 (1922); Brown v. Harmon, 59 Ga. App. 373, 1 S.E.2d 33 (1939); Lembeck v. Jarvis
Terminal Cold Storage Co., 69 N.J. 781, 63 A. 257 (1906). Therefore, if the parties understood
that the owner could remove his property even temporarily, no lien existed. See Annot., 3
A.L.R. 664 (1919); Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 804, 902 (1956). Thus the livery stable keeper was
denied a lien at common law. So too, the garage keeper, who succeeded to the livery stable
keeper's position, was precluded at common law from asserting the lien. See generally Lam-
bert v. Nicklass, 45 W. Va. 527, 31 S.E. 951 (1898).
35. Some authority holds that the lien detaches while the property is out of the possession
of the lienor, but revests when the property is returned. See Drummond v. Griffin, 114 Me.
120, 95 A. 506 (1915); North End Auto Park, Inc. v. Petringa Trucking Co., 337 Mass. 618,
150 N.E.2d 735 (1958).
36. See J.M. Lowe Auto Co. v. Winkler, 727 Ark. 433, 191 S.W. 927 (1917).
37. See Hughes v. Aetna Ins. Co., 261 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1953); Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Close,
81 W. Va. 205, 94 S.E. 132 (1917); Burrough v. Ely, 54 W. Va. 118, 46 S.E. 371 (1903).
38. See Whitlock v. Heard, 13 Ala. 776 (1898).
39. See, e.g., Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Saulsberry, 126 Ky. 179, 103 S.W. 254 (1907);
National Bond & Inv. Co. v. Haas, 124 Neb. 631, 247 N.W. 563 (1933).
The Uniform Commercial Code allows enforcement of a carrier's or warehouseman's lien
by public or private sale on commercially reasonable terms after notification of all those
known to claim an interest in the goods. UwsoRM CoMMRncAI CoDo §§ 7-210, 7-308. The
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act similarly allows sale to enforce a warehouseman's lien.
Uarwon WARxHouSa REcamyr Acr § 33.
40. The Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 78 (1972), recognized the sparse
similarities between today's creditors' remedies and their common law antecedents.
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years the Supreme Court has made clear that the touchstone of such
a reevaluation is the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
THZ DUE PROCESS STANDARD
A two-step analysis determines the application of the due process
guarantee of the fourteenth amendment to a challenged activity
such as the operation of possessory liens. First, the examination
must consider whether the challenged conduct comes within the
scope of the guarantee: due process protection arises if state action 1
brings about a deprivation42 of a constitutionally cognizable inter-
est.13 Challengers must meet each of those three requirements be-
cause the absence of any one removes the controverted conduct from
the fourteenth amendment's protection.4' After concluding that the
41. See notes 109-58 infra & accompanying text.
42. See notes 72-108 infra & accompanying text.
43. See notes 48-71 infra & accompanying text.
44. Despite the emerging debtor-creditor due process law, a constitutionally cognizable
interest may be affected without due process protections. The deprivation may occur without
the requisite state action. See notes 132-37, 152-53 infra & accompanying text.
Further, an emergency may justify abandoning due process protection, or the debtor may
waive his due process protections. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), clearly reject the notion that a creditor's interest in
collecting, without more, is sufficient to create an emergency which would justify prehearing
remedies. It is not clear, however, whether a creditor's interest ever could qualify as a "truly
unusual" situation justifying such action. Sniadach, in fact, did allude to an extraordinary
"governmental or creditor" interest. 395 U.S. at 339 (emphasis supplied). Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the language of which was used as the basis for the Fuentes emer-
gency exception, 407 U.S. at 90, seemed to suggest that only a "governmental interest" would
justify short circuiting due process protection. 401 U.S. at 378-79. In Fuentes, Justice Stewart
enunciated three criteria for determining whether an "extraordinary situation" is present:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an impor-
tant governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special
need for prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its mono-
poly of legitimate force; the person initiating the seizure has been a government
official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn
statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance.
407 U.S. at 91. Justice Stewart found objectionable the replevin statutes in Fuentes because
they did not limit summary seizure to situations where there was an "immediate danger that
a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed goods." Id. at 93. Despite the difficulty of
characterizing a creditor's interest as "an important governmental or general public interest,"
some commentators have read that language as anticipating that a creditor might come
within the Fuentes emergency exception. See, e.g., Clark & Landers, supra note 1, at 369;
West & Berman, The Issue of Sniadach, 79 Comm. L.J. 49, 50 (1974). Another commentator
has cautioned that since all litigation is an extraordinary situation because it represents a
breakdown in the usual social process, expansion of the emergency exception could destroy
the due process rule. See Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 3 Ky.
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due process restraints apply, the investigation secondly must map
the perimeter of the restraints. 5 Although such a mechanical
checklist suggests a certainty of result, the preliminary conclusion
regarding the scope of the due process guarantee depends on subtle
factual variations;" after that conclusion, courts still must deter-
mine the specific protective procedures mandated by due process.
The Supreme Court's repeated efforts in the past three years to forge
a procedural due process standard applicable to the field of credi-
tors' rights illustrates the difficulty of the task.47
Constitutionally Cognizable Interest
The fourteenth amendment provides protection for life, liberty,
and property, 8 the last of which is the constitutionally cognizable
interest relevant to a debtor-creditor analysis. Courts have seized
upon Justice Harlan's cogent concurrence in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp."5 to develop a concept of property focused upon its
continued use and enjoyment and have fused that concept with
Justice Stewart's subsequent analysis in Fuentes v. Shevin" to re-
quire notice and an opportunity for a hearing before curtailment of
the mere use and enjoyment of property." From Sniadach through
L.J. 531, 583 (1975). Although the courts seem cognizant of that danger and thus far have
restricted the use of the exception, two additional criteria have been proposed to obviate the
danger. Commentators have suggested that a creditor be required to establish the absence of
other assets to satisfy his claim should he prevail and establish a substantial probability of
success on the merits. See Clark & Landers, supra note 1, at 370.
The Supreme Court in D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), announced
that due process rights of notice and an opportunity for hearing could be waived if the waiver
is made "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly." Id. at 187. Such criteria necessarily
require a case-by-case determination. An examination of the factors considered by the Court,
however, casts doubt upon the applicability of the decision to the typical debtor-creditor
relationship. See id. at 188.
45. See notes 159-88 infra & accompanying text.
46. See Clark & Landers, supra note 1, at 362-64.
47. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974); Fuentes v. Shavin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
48. "INlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
49. 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
50. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
51. See, eg., Graff v. Nicholl, 370 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. 11. 1974); Bay State Harness Horse
R. & B. Ass'n v. PPG Industries, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973); Gunter v. Mer-
chants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D. Me. 1973); Lynch v. Household Fin. Co.,
360 F. Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973); Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga.), modified,
364 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Nork v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 997, 109 Cal. Rptr.
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Fuentes the inquiry followed the clearly defined two-step process
generally applicable to due process questions 2 Courts first deter-
mined whether the fourteenth amendment applied; then, in
determing what the fourteenth amendment required, they balanced
the competing interests of the debtor and creditor.
The opinions in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,13 however, tend to
obscure the line between the two separate inquiries,4 in effect aban-
doning what one commentator has called the Fuentes "first define,
then balance approach,""5 in favor of a merged one-step evaluation
which determines whether the debtor's interest is protected by bal-
ancing it against the creditor's interest. Because Louisiana law gave
an installment seller a vendor's lien to secure the unpaid balance
of the purchase price,5" the Court in Mitchell concluded that "both
seller and buyer had current, real interests in the property ....
Resolution of the due process question must take account not only
of the interests of the buyer of the property but those of the seller
as well."5 ' This duality of interest may be the basis for the Mitchell
decision" despite the fact that, while accepting the premise of the
428 (1973); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.B.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d
170 (1973). But cf. Harrison v. Morris, 370 F. Supp. 142 (D.S.C. 1974); Cook v. Carlson, 364
F. Supp. 24 (D.S.D. 1973).
52. See notes 41-45 supra & accompanying text.
53. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974). See generally Note, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. - The Reposses-
sion of Fuentes, 5 Mai. ST. U.L. Ry. 74 (1974).
54. Mitchell appeared to place great reliance on the presence of dual interests in the
sequestered property. See notes 56-61 infra & accompanying text. It is not clear, however,
whether the effect of the dual interest was to defeat the finding of a constitutionally
cognizable interest, thus negating the need for due process procedural protections, or whether
the dual interest was merely a factor setting the parameters of due process requirements. See
94 S. Ct. at 1898, 1901. Since Mitchell arguably can be read either way, it will be discussed
in both contexts.
55. Rendleman, supra note 44, at 542. In discussing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972), Professor Rendleman explained the Court's approach:
In deciding whether due process was compelled, the Court looked to the pres-
ence, not the magnitude, of the citizen interest. It refused to balance state and
citizen interests, observing "[W]e must look not to the 'weight' but to the
nature of the interest at stake." Of course, the demonstration of liberty or
property is a question of fact, and if either is shown, the state cannot act without
due process. Once it has been determined that due process applies, i.e., that
there is a cognizable liberty or property interest, the Court will "weigh" the
citizen and state interests to determine whatbparticular procedures due process
requires.
Rendleman, supra note 44, at 547 (footnotes omitted).
56. LA. Civ. CoD art. 3227 (Slovenko 1961).
57. 94 S. Ct. at 1898.
58. The Court stated: "With this duality in mind, we are convinced that the Louisiana
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Fuentes dissent, the Mitchell majority claimed not to overrule
Fuentes.59
The different receptions given the dual interest argument in
Mitchell and Fuentes can, of course, be explained by a shift in the
Court's ideology,"0 but the anomaly can be resolved more satisfacto-
rily by recognizing that under Louisiana personal property law any
transfer of possession by the buyer defeated the vendor's lien.61 The
seller's interest in nontransfer by the debtor arguably was sufficient
to create an interest in the property for the seller as well as the
buyer. Since proper filing preserves the seller's security in jurisdic-
tions governed by the Uniform Commercial Code,2 Mitchell's im-
pact may be limited to Louisiana; a narrower reading of the case,
moreover, would confine its effect to Orleans Parish, the only Louis-
iana parish in which judges, at least nominally, issue writs of se-
questration.6 3
Despite its apparent reliance in Mitchell on the dual interests of
debtor and creditor, the Supreme Court in North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,64 found a Georgia garnishment statute65 vul-
nerable for the reasons enumerated in Fuentes and distinguished
Mitchell without mentioning the dual-interest factor.6 The impact
sequestration procedure is not invalid, either on its face or as applied." Id. at 1899.
59. The Court held that Fuentes did not require the invalidation of the Louisiana seques-
tration procedure. Id. at 1904. Nonetheless, Justice Powell, concurring in the result, con-
cluded: "The Court's decision today withdraws significantly from the full reach of that
principle, and to this extent I think it fair to say that the Fuentes opinion is overruled." Id.
at 1908.
60. Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not take part in Fuentes, but voted with the major-
ity in Mitchell. See id. at 1914 (dissenting opinion). If judicial turnover governs, one merely
can join Justice Roberts in bemoaning the "restricted railroad ticket" approach of the Court
and proceed to deal with the "new" law: "The reason for my concern is that the instant
decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this
tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only."
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
61. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3228 (Slovenko 1961). See 94 S. Ct. at 1901. See also In re Trahan,
283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.), aff'd, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930
(1969).
62. See UmrFomlu COMER CIAL CODE § 9-307(2).
63. A footnote to the majority opinion seems to affirm the pivotal importance of the judicial
participation. 94 S. Ct. at 1906 n.14. One commentator has resolved the apparent Fuentes-
Mitchell conflict by construing the Mitchell approach as applicable only to written, consen-
sually created liens. See Rendleman, supra note 44, at 555.
64. 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 46-101 (1974).
66. 95 S. Ct. at 722. North Georgia Finishing involved a statute authorizing garnishment
upon presentation of an affidavit and bond to an authorized officer of the court. Garnishment
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of the omission is unclear; indeed, the import of the entire decision
is unclear. Because of what the dissent viewed as a studied effort
at evasion,6 7 however, it would seem premature to conclude from the
Court's failure to discuss the dual-interest factor that it has been
abrogated.
The effect of Mitchell, then, is uicertain, but if it extends beyond
the boundaries of Louisiana, it may affect possessory liens, and the
effects should differ among the various possessory liens according to
the duality of interest. The repairman's lien, insofar as it is a deten-
tion provision,"8 appears insulated from due process attack under a
Mitchell analysis balancing the interests of the debtor and the credi-
tor to determine whether the debtor has a protected interest. Be-
cause the repairman usually has added material and labor to the
chattel, he has incorporated something of his own into it and
thereby creates in himself a property interest." In a very real sense
the property interest is dual, the repairman's interest arguably
being more direct than that of a secured seller.
The holder's lien has less assurance of immunity from due process
challenge under a Mitchell analysis. Although the carrier and ware-
houseman have provided the debtor-chattel owner with a service
and, in the course of performing this service they necessarily have
could be dissolved by the filing of a counter bond by the principal defendant. Di-Chem
utilized that statute to garnish the bank account of North Georgia Finishing. Id. at 721. The
Court distinguished Mitchell on several grounds: the writ of garnishment in North Georgia
Finishing was issuable on a mere affidavit of the creditor or his attorney, without any require-
ment that the latter have personal knowledge of the facts; the affidavit only needed to contain
conclusory allegations; the writ was issuable without participation by a judge; upon service
of the writ the debtor was deprived of the use of the property in the hands of the garnishee;
no provision existed for an "early hearing" on the issue of probable cause for the garnishment;
and challenge to the garnishment could not be entertained without filing of a bond by the
debtor. Id. at 722-23.
67. Id. at 726 (dissenting opinion).
68. Possessory liens typically consist of a detention provision and a sale provision. See, e.g.,
N.Y. LmNLAw § 184 (McKinney 1966); id. §§ 201,202,204 (McKinney Supp. 1974). See notes
37-39 supra & accompanying text.
69. One commentator has noted that such an analysis still may dodge the fundamental
question which he perceives as the "genuineness of the putative creditor's claim." See Rendle-
man, supra note 44, at 557. Rendleman noted that if Mitchell is limited to written, consen-
sually created liens, see note 63 supra, the security agreement is at least some evidence of
the claim. Rendleman, supra note 44, at 558. Similarly, the voluntary surrender of possession
by the debtor and the productive labor of the repairman may be seen as "some evidence" of
the claim. Despite such evidence, garageman's lien cases frequently arise as disputes regard-
ing the genuineness of the repairman's claim. See, e.g., Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th
Cir. 1974); Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 407 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973).
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dealt with the chattel, they have not incorporated material into or
increased the value of the chattel." The asserted lien, therefore,
occupies the middle ground between the repairman's lien, which
arises from the incorporation of labor and materials into the chattel,
and an attachment, which may arbitrarily effect a lien on a chattel
unrelated to the controversy.7' Despite their relation to the liened
chattel, the holders' liens should not be accorded dual-interest sta-
tus; otherwise, any creditor's claim arising from dealings in the
disputed property would seem to qualify for such status, thereby
obliterating Fuentes.
The dual-interest concept of Mitchell is even less applicable to
the lien asserted by landlords and innkeepers. An innkeeper detains
a guest's chattel not to protect it from waste or because the
innkeeper has in any way improved the chattel; rather his interest
lies in forcing rental payment. It is difficult to argue that such an
interest in any direct way sprang from the withheld goods, for the
debt has no direct relationship with the chattel, nor was possession
of the chattel ever surrendered to the lienor.
Deprivation
The search for a constitutionally cognizable interest leads to in-
vestigation of a second factor determining the applicability of the
due process guarantee: the deprivation of that interest once found.
Fuentes established that the length of the deprivation is insignifi-
cant, that even a short-term, temporary deprivation triggered due
process restraints. 2 That case, however, is not particularly helpful
in resolving the more fundamental issue of exactly what constitutes
a fourteenth amendment deprivation of property.
Fuentes indicates that the seizure and removal of property by a
sheriff is a clear fourteenth amendment deprivation, but does not
specify what other creditor conduct may effect a deprivation.7 3 Since
70. A commodity can experience an increase in value when transported from an area of
increased supply to an area of decreased supply. The transportation of fruits and vegetables
from California to New York City in the winter season is such an example. Warehousing goods
during a period of increased supply for release in a period of decreased supply has a similar
result. Since the carrier or warehouseman has not modified the chattel itself, however, it is
difficult to label his interest a property interest.
71. It has been contended that seizure of property for jurisdictional purposes is seldom
justified. See generally Note, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82
YALE L.J. 1023, 1032-36 (1973).
72. 407 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1972).
73. Commentators generally have posed the question without positing a solution. See, e.g.,
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statutory possessory liens typically contain both a detention provi-
sion and a sale provision, these provisions must be measured sepa-
rately against the due process standard to determine whether a
deprivation arises. Sale of a retained chattel without notice and an
opportunity for a hearing undoubtedly works a fourteenth amend-
ment deprivation. Such a sale extinguishes all property rights of the
debtor, a permanent deprivation more severe than the temporary
deprivation voided in Fuentes.74 In the case of the detention provi-
sion of a possessory lien, however, possession in some sense pre-
viously has been surrendered to the lienor. The absence of seizure
and removal as in Fuentes supports an argument that no depriva-
tion has occurred, an argument that is strongest for repairmen's and
holders' liens, but weaker for innkeepers' liens where possession has
not in any real sense been relinquished by the debtor.
Unfortunately for the developing body of law, several recent cases
have failed to deal with the detention provisions of challenged pos-
sessory liens. In Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc.75 an
automobile owner challenged both the detention and sale provisions
of the New York Lien Law78 which allowed a garageman to detain
an automobile until the owner paid both storage and repair
charges,77 but the debtor's failure to request the return of his car or
Clark & Landers, supra note 1: "But one may wonder whether any alteration of possession
or ownership short of a physical taking is a 'deprivation' within the fourteenth amendment.
For example, is the placing of a lien on the debtor's property without notice and hearing
unconstitutional?" Id. at 363. When the lien was merely a record lien involving no obstruction
to use or possession, merely encumbering title, some courts have characterized the depriva-
tion as "de minimus" and abrogated requirements of prior notice and a hearing. See Cook v.
Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24 (D.S.D. 1973).
74. Deprivations more severe than in those Fuentes have been noted on numerous occa-
sions:
Comparing the Lien Law here to the replevin statutes struck down in Fuentes,
there would appear to be an even greater disregard for the basic elements of due
process. The sale of the liened goods, for example, completely extinguishes the
possibility of any future right of repossession in the event of ultimate success
on the merits; replevin, in contrast, is a provisional remedy intended to preserve
the integrity of the goods pending trial on the underlying claim.
Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378, 385 (2d Cir. 1973) (concurring
opinion). See also Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491, 493 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Adams v.
Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 156, 520 P.2d 961, 965, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145,
151 (1974).
75. 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973).
76. N.Y. LI= LAw § 184 (McKinney 1966); id. §§ 201, 202, 204 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
77. After Hernandez's automobile suffered damage in a collision, he requested that an
employee of European Auto Collision tow the car to the corporation's garage and estimate
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to tender reasonable charges mooted his challenge to the detention
provision of the lien law."' Since the concurring justices also re-
garded the challenge to the detention provision as nonjusticiable,"
their conclusion that the debtor's initial voluntary relinquishment
of possession did not distinguish Hernandez from the seizure cases"
was confined to the sale provision. The reasoning upon which their
conclusion was based, however, seems equally applicable to the de-
tention provision.81 In another case, Mason v. Garris,82 the plaintiffs
the cost of repair; he specifically requested that the corporation not repair the car until after
an insurance estimate. Contrary to those instructions, European Auto Collision repaired the
automobile and asserted its garageman's lien. Id. at 381. See Note, Procedural Due Pro-
cess-Post-Fuentes Constitutionality of Garagemen's Liens, 54 B.U.L. REv. 542, 545.46
(1974); Note, The Extension of Due Process Requirements to Lien Enforcement Provi-
sions-The Potential Impact on Iowa Law, 59 IowA L. REv. 1226 (1974); Comment, The
Constitutionality of Garagemen's Liens, 5 U. TOL..L. REv. 311 (1974).
78. 487 F.2d at 382.
79. Id. at 383 (concurring opinion). Judge Timbers based the argument that the detention
claim was no longer justiciable on the lack of available relief for the accomplished sale of the
automobile. Id. at 387.
80. The concurring opinion concluded:
As I read the cases, however, it is the deprivation of a significant property
interest that gives rise to the requirement of a prior opportunity to be heard.
Here, it is true that [the debtor] in a sense voluntarily delivered his car for the
purpose of temporary storage and perhaps eventual repair. But it cannot be
seriously contended that at the same time he voluntarily relinquished his prop-
erty interest in the car. Indeed, the law is clear that, while a bailment creates a
new property interest in the bailee, it does not divest the bailor of his continuing
interest and title. I find little, if any, significance in the fact that the initial
delivery of the car was voluntary. I would not distinguish this case from the
seizure cases on that ground.
Id. at 384-85 (concurring opinion) (citations omitted).
81. A New York court employed the same reasoning in invalidating the detention provision
of New York's warehouseman's lien. Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d
726, 358 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1974). See notes 91-96 infra & accompanying text.
82. 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga.), modified, 364 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ga. 1973). The case
combined two class actions challenging the constitutionality of Georgia's mechanic's lien
statute. In Mason v. Garris the debtor loaned her automobile to a friend who, when it began
to malfunction, had it towed to the creditor's service station. The debtor claimed that,
because of the absence of a contract for repairs, she had a good defense to the creditor's
attempted lien foreclosure. Id. at 421-22. In Allen v. Rosser, the debtor contracted with the
creditor for automobile repairs at an agreed price of $257.85. After surrender of possession,
the creditor informed her that there would be an additional charge of $100. Unwilling and
unable to pay the additional fee, the debtor requested the return of her automobile unre-
paired, but the creditor indicated that all repairs had been made and asserted his lien for
$357.85. Id. at 422. See Note, Procedural Due Process-Post-Fuentes Constitutionality of
Garagemen's Liens, 54 B.U.L. REy. 542 (1974); Note, The Extension of Due Process Require-
ments to Lien Enforcement Provisions-The Potential Impact on Iowa Law, 59 IowA L. Rlv.
1226 (1974).
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failed to attack that portion of the Georgia statute which allowed
mechanics to retain vehicles,1 but the the court's conclusion that
voluntary surrender failed to avoid due process requirements"4 argu-
ably is equally applicable to a detention provision. In a third case,
Stra/ey v. Gassaway Motor Co. s8 the court failed to consider sepa-
rately the detention and sale provisions of the West Virginia im-
prover's lien law," summarily holding it unconstitutional on the
argument that the repairman's lien was "less satisfying of due pro-
cess requirements" than previously invalidated landlord's distress
procedures.8 7
Despite the uncertain applicability of the three decisions to the
detention provision of repairmen's liens, one commentator has
argued that the reasoning of the three cases implies that a depriva-
tion occurs when the lienor retains, or decides to retain, possession
of the chattel.8 Analyzing various creditors' remedies in light of
Fuentes, other commentators also have rejected the thesis that orig-
inal voluntary surrender avoids the deprivation requisite to invoke
the fourteenth amendment. They argue that the relinquishment was
for a limited and specific purpose, and, in view of the consumer's
expectation, a deprivation occurs upon refusal to return retained
goods,89 an argument markedly similar to the rejection by the
Hernandez and Mason courts of the contention that voluntary sur-
render cured objections to the sale provisions.
83. GA. STAT. ANN. § 68-423a (Supp. 1974). See 360 F. Supp. at 423.
84. The court in Mason considered whether the voluntary surrender created a significant
property interest in the mechanic rising to the level of the "use" interest of the automobile
owner. Thus, that court seemed to be construing the voluntary surrender as a factor in
balancing the interests of the two parties, rather than as a factor in determining whether a
deprivation had occurred. 360 F. Supp. at 424.
85. 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973). The creditor garage estimated that transmission
repairs on the debtor's automobile would cost between $60 and $70. Upon making the repairs,
the garage demanded $230.11, a cost exceeding the $150 value of the automobile. After the
debtor refused payment, the creditor asserted a repairman's lien. Id. at 902. See Note,
Procedural Due Process-Post-Fuentes Constitutionality of Garagemen's Liens, 54 B.U.L.
Ray. 542 (1974); Note, The Extension of Due Process Requirements to Lien Enforcement
Provisions-The Potential Impact on Iowa Law, 59 IowA L. Rh,. 1226 (1974).
86. W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 38-11-3 (1966); id. § 38-11-14 (Supp. 1974).
87. 359 F. Supp. at 905.
88. Note, The Extension of Due Process Requirements to Lien Enforcement Provi-
sions-The Potential Impact on Iowa Law, 59 IowA L. REV. 1226, 1234 (1974).
89. See Clark & Landers, supra note 1, at 386.
90. See notes 75-84 supra & accompanying text.
On preliminary examination, Magro v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 338 F. Supp.
464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), af'd, 460 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 961 (1972) (pre-
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Among those courts which have confronted directly the detention
provisions of possessory liens, one found the detention aspect of the
New York warehouseman's lien indistinguishable in its conse-
quences from the seizure statutes. In Jones v. Banner Moving &
Storage, Inc.2 a tenant had been evicted from her apartment while
she was outside of the state; after the storage company obtained
possession of her personal property from her 18-year-old daughter,
the tenant was notified that unless the storage bill was paid, her
possessions would be sold at public sale. She.then challenged the
constitutionality of sections 7-209 and 7-210 of the New York Uni-
form Commercial Code,92 grounding her argument on the due pro-
cess requirements of both the United States and New York constitu-
tions. Invalidating the detention provision, 3 the court found the
lack of seizure irrelevant to the deprivation issue: "If it is the depri-
vation of a tangible property right or a significant property interest
that gives rise to the requirement of an opportunity to be heard, it
would seem that the method of deprivation is immaterial. Whether
the use of property is denied because it is taken away by seizure, or
if it is denied because it is withheld from a party's use by an asserted
lien, a deprivation nevertheless occurs."94
The court demonstrated persuasive logic at that point in the opin-
ion, but it then measured the New York warehouseman's lien
against the Mitchell requirements. The court distinguished Mitchell
by noting that since possession was in the defendant storage com-
Fuentes case challenging constitutionality of warehouseman's lien), appears to rely upon the
voluntary delivery to reject a finding of deprivation. The court summarily stated three "mate-
rial differences" between the Wisconsin statute attacked in Sniadach and the New York
warehouseman's lien opposed in Magro:
First, the property here involved has been voluntarily and knowingly delivered
to the party seeking to execute on it. Second, the statute in question here
specifically provides for notice, and the bailor may enter the courts to obtain
redress after receipt of that notice. Third, the deprivation of property which has
been voluntarily parted with for long periods of time cannot be held to have the
same disastrous effect as those "specialized typels] of property" referred to by
the Court in Sniadach.
338 F. Supp. at 467. A more detailed examination of the opinion, however, shows that the
court relied on the voluntary surrender to establish the absence of a "specialized type of
property" rather than a lack of deprivation. Id. at 468. Fuentes refuted the notion that the
due process requirements of Sniadach applied only to "necessaries," thereby minimizing the
effect of the Magro opinion. See note 5 supra.
91. 78 Misc. 2d 726, 358 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
92. N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 7-209, 7-210 (McKinney 1964).
93. 78 Misc. 2d at , 358 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
94. Id. at , 358 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 16:971
POSSESSORY LIENS
pany rather than in the plaintiff, there was no risk of transfer or
concealment. 5 This retention of possession, however, was what the
court found unconstitutional, and the court's decision, therefore,
prevented the very retention of possession which it recited as one
distinction removing the case from the Mitchell rule. The court's
contradiction suggests an inadequate understanding of due process
considerations, a weakness which may eliminate the support that
the Jones decision provides for the view that mere detention consti-
tutes a constitutionally significant deprivation.
Notwithstanding these arguments by courts and commentators
that detention constitutes deprivation,9 7 the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia reached a contrary result in Adams v. Department of Motor
Vehicles.8 The court distinguished between the detention and sale
provisions of the California garageman's lien law when measuring
that statute against the deprivation element of the due process stan-
dard, holding the interim retention provision compatible with due
process.9 Emphasizing that the garageman was in rightful posses-
sion at the time he asserted his lien, the court reversed the familiar
deprivation argument by noting that, were the retention provision
to be struck down, "the garageman would be deprived of his posses-
sory interest precisely as were the debtors in Shevin and Blair."100
It based its decision upon the general legal policy of protecting a
vested possessory right until competing claims have been judicially
determined."' As in Fuentes, the emphasis was on preserving the
status quo; unlike Fuentes and the majority of its progeny, this
emphasis in Adams favored the creditor asserting a garageman's
lien.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit joined the California
court in its preserve-the-status-quo approach to the deprivation
issue in Phillips v. Money, °1 2 a due process challenge to an Indiana
statute"'3 sanctioning summary detention of a vehicle until the pay-
95. Id. at-., 358 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
96. Id. at_, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
97. See notes 88-96 supra & accompanying text.
98. 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974).
99. Id. at 154, 520 P.2d at 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
100. Id. at 155, 520 P.2d at 966, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
101. 11 Cal. 3d at 155 n.15, 520 P.2d at 966 n.15, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 150 n.15.
102. 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974).
103. IND. CODE § 9-9-5-6 (1971).
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ment of a repair bill. After disposing of the challenge on the basis
that no state action was involved, ' the court stated that, even
assuming the existence of state action, it would not invalidate the
Indiana procedure.' It argued that both Fuentes and Mitchell were
distinguishable because the procedures challenged in those cases
required a seizure from the debtor, thereby altering the status quo:
"In contrast here the voluntary surrender of the motor vehicle to the
garageman, albeit for the limited purpose of performing authorized
repairs, results in the garageman having both a legal property inter-
est, in the form of a lien, and actual possession. Interference with
the status quo would be necessary to enable the owner to regain
possession prior to final judgment."' As in Adams, the court re-
garded the creditor's rightful possession of the liened chattel as
obviating the question of any deprivation of the debtor's interest.
Courts apparently have not faced the voluntary surrender argu-
ment in the context of the innkeeper's lien. The cases unanimously
speak of a "seizure," rather than a "retention," of the debtor's prop-
erty,07 thus reinforcing the contention that guests or tenants have
not relinquished possession willfully.0 ' Whatever the persuasiveness
of the Adams-Phillips rationale as applied to repairmen's and
holders' liens, innkeepers' liens clearly would seem to work a depri-
vation.
State Action
Despite the deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable interest,
due process protections still will not attach unless state action is
present.' Analysis of the state action question is difficult because,
in reality, no state can act; a state is capable of acting only through
individuals. At the other extreme, no conduct is entirely private
104. See note 135 infra & accompanying text.
105. 503 F.2d at 994.
106. Id. at 994-95.
107. For example, the Court of Appeals of New York concluded: "In resolving the conflict-
ing interests and in light of the feasible alternatives, we believe the guest's interest in posses-
sion and use of his property outweighs the innkeeper's interest in summarily seizing that
property to secure the payment of charges." Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d
15, 22, 300 N.E.2d 710, 715, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 176-77 (1973)(footnotes omitted).
108. See Comment, The Future of Creditors' Remedies in New York: The Impact of
Fuentes and Blye, 38 ALBANY L. REV. 467, 471 n.36 (1974).
109. The Supreme Court made clear in 1883 that the fourteenth amendment does not
prohibit private incursions upon constitutional rights: "It is state action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter
of the amendment." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
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because, if a state fails to prohibit conduct, it implicitly sanctions
it. Courts have had to fashion a definition of state action between
the two extremes, " ' but because they originally did so in the context
of finding racial discrimination violative of the equal protection
clause, definitions of state action well may be broader for equal
protection purposes than for due process purposes.m Since the his-
110. Since the Uniform Commercial Code seems to envision replevin and self-help repos-
session as alternatives, the Fuentes invalidation of replevin might be a death knell to the
closely related self-help repossession. See UNwoRm Co mcRa CODE § 9-503. Thus far the
finding of a lack of state action, however, has preserved the self-help remedy in the majority
of the decided cases. See Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 767 (1973). Cases
holding self-help repossession to be state action include the following: Watson v. Branch
County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.
Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Boland v. Essex County Bank & Trust, 361 F.
Supp. 917 (D. Mass. 1973); Adams v. Egley, 338F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), reu'd sub nom.
Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S.
Ct. 325 (1974). See also Lee v. Cooper, 2 Pov. L. REP. 19,206 (D.N.J. 1974) (repairman's
lien); Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (garageman's lien); Northrip
v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (mortgage foreclosure);
Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145
(1974) (garageman's lien).
Those cases are outnumbered by those holding self-help repossession not to constitute state
action: Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d
1107 (3d Cir. 1974); Brantley v. Union Bank &Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 517 (1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S.
Ct. 329 (1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 325 (1974); Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 371 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Tex. 1973);
Mayhugh v. Bill Allen Chevrolet, 371 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Nowlin v.
Professional Auto Sales, 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 328 (1974); Kinch v.
Chrysler Credit Corp., 367 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Nichols v. Tower Grove Bank,
362 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 404 (1974); Shelton v. General Elea. Credit
Corp., 359 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Kirksey v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo.
1972); Pease v. Hauelock Nat'l Bank, 351 F. Supp. 118 (D. Neb. 1972); Greene v. First Nat'l
Exch. Bank, 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972); Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21
(N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Kipp
v. Cozens, 40 Cal. App. 3d 709,115 Cal. Rptr. 423 (Ct. App. 1974). See also Phillips v. Money,
503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974) (garageman's lien); Melara v. Kennedy, 2 Poy. L. REP. 19,603
(N.D. Cal. 1974) (warehouseman's lien); Leisure Estates of America v. Carmel Dev. Co., 371
F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (repossession under deed of trust); Bichel Optical Labs., Inc.
v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 336 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Minn. 1971), af'd, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.
1973) (bank seizure of accounts receivable); Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521
P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974) (bank setoff); Sifuentes v. Weed, 525 P.2d 1157 (Colo.
1974) (issuance of title to repossessor).
111. See, e.g., Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 445 F.2d 1150,1155 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971); Coleman
v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1970); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 693
(D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969); Bight v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382,
1392-93 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). See also Burke
& Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Four-
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torical roots of the fourteenth amendment 12 have not restricted ex-
pansion of due process into areas unrelated to racial discrimina-
tion, 13 however, restriction of the state action element to selective
topic areas would appear unjustified."' The Supreme Court,
teenth Amendment, 46 So. CAL. L. Ray. 1003, 1073 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Essay on the
Fourteenth Amendment, part 11.
112. The fourteenth amendment is one member of the post-Civil War trio of constitutional
amendments designed to eliminate slavery and racial discrimination. The thirteenth amend-
ment abolished both slavery and involuntary servitude except as punishment for a crime. The
fifteenth amendment prohibited the denial or any abridgment of the right to vote "on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The original purpose of the fourteenth
amendment was to eradicate racial discrimination in all its forms: "The clear and central
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious
racial discrimination in the States." Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 10 (1967). For a general
discussion, see J. TEN BRoax, TH ANmLAvERY OmoGms OF THE FounTEEim AmENDitmEr
(1951); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws", 50
CoLum. L. Rav. 131 (1950). Recognizing that purpose, two opposing tamps are divided on the
extent to which the historical roots of the amendment limit present-day application of the
state action doctrine. See note 114 infra.
113. Besides the 1969 expansion into debtor-creditor relations in Sniadach, the Supreme
Court has dealt with the due process clause in relation to procedures for terminating welfare
assistance, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); suspending a driver's license, Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); evicting a tenant, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972);
prohibiting local access to liquor, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); and
terminating public employment, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Other procedures
challenged on due process grounds include sterilization of mental retardants, Wyatt v. Ader-
holdt, 368 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. Ala. 1973); expulsion of a student from a military academy,
Hagopion v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972), and Brown v. Knowlton, 370 F. Supp.
1119 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); exclusion of an individual from a college campus, Braxton v. Municipal
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 138, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973); termination of disability
benefits, Williams v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ga. 1973); termination of unem-
ployment compensation, Crow v. California Dep't of Human Resources De., 490 F.2d 580
(9th Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 95 S. Ct. 1110 (1975), and Pregent v. New Hampshire
Dep't of Employment See., 361 F. Supp. 782 (D.N.H. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2595 (1974);
termination of township poor relief, Brooks v. Center Township, 485 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974); impounding of trespassing cattle, McVay v. United States,
481 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1973); impounding of abandoned automobiles, Graff v. Nicholl, 370 F.
Supp. 974 (N.D. IM. 1974); impounding of infinging articles, Jondora Music Publ. Co. v.
Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J. 1973); destruction of a public nuisance,
Traylor v. City of Amarillo, 492 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1974), and Pioneer Say. & Loan Co. v.
City of Cleveland, 479 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1973); seizure of automobiles used to transport
narcotics, United States v. One 1967 Porsche, 492 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1974); and ejectment of
a tenant from public housing, Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
114. Perhaps the disagreement concerns not the extent to which courts should limit the
doctrine, but the extent to which the racial context has influenced the courts in developing
the state action doctrine. The question arises: Would the courts have developed the doctrine
differently had the cases arisen originally on other than racial grounds? One viewpoint an-
swers the question affirmatively. See Essay on the FourteenthAmendment, part 1, supra note
111, at 1040. According to this view, the courts stretched the state action doctrine to its outer
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moreover, specifically rejected distinctions between personal and
property rights in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp."': "[Tihe
dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false
one. Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to
enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right
to speak or the right to travel, is in truth, a 'personal' right. .... ,,
Such comments by the Court bolster the argument for a single defi-
nition of state action.
Possessory liens and their methods of ehforcement vary among
jurisdictions in particulars which may determine the state action
issue. The Georgia garageman's lien statute voided in Mason v.
Garris"7 provided for enforcement by state officials through a levy
and sale; similarly, the Kentucky and West Virginia landlord lien
statutes"' invalidated in Holt v. Brown"9 and Shaffer v. Holbrook"'
required that an officer of the court issue the writ. The state action
in such cases is apparent."' Other possessory liens operate extra-
judicially, private parties asserting and enforcing them without
state assistance, but the state in some manner frequently recognizes
the transfer following the sale2- and thereby sets off the state action
limits to aid racial minorities who were thought to have little chance of forcing the political
process to respond; following enactment of legislation to protect minorities, the doctrine
should be restricted. See id. at 1040. The opposing view finds the "state function" and
"entwinement" theories easily transpiantable, if notindigenous, to the area of debtor-creditor
due processlaw and implicitly rejects the notion that the evolution of the state action doctrine
would have varied had it occurred in a context other than that of racial discrimination. See
Clark & Landers, supra note 1, at 377-83.
115. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
116. Id. at 552. Lynch established that property rights are entitled to protection as great
as that given personal rights. Other cases have established that due process does not afford
greater protection for property than for personal liberty. See United States v. One 1967
Porsche, 492 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1974).
117. 360 F. Supp. 420, modified, 364 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See notes 82-84 supra
& accompanying text.
118. Ky. Rzv. STAT. AN. §§ 383.040, 383.050 (1972); W. VA. Coi)n ANN. § 37-6-12 (1966).
119. 336 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
120. 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va. 1972).
121. The Supreme Court did not discuss the state action issue in Sniadach, Fuentes, or
Mitchell, because of the participation by state agents. Although the creditor's lawyer served
the garnishee in Sniadach, the clerk of the court issued the summons. Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 338 (1969). The sheriff accomplished the repossession in Fuentes
after a writ of replevin was issued. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 69 (1972). A judge issued
the writs of sequestration in Mitchell. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895,1899 (1974).
122. After the sale of the liened chattel, the state frequently issues title to the purchaser.
Recent cases have declined to find state action, arguing that the debtor's best interest is to
have title transferred in case of an accident, Kipp v. Cozens, 40 Cal. App. 3d 709, 717, 115
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debate. If state action is to be found in the context of extrajudicial
possessory liens, it usually is premised on the "state function"
theory of state action or on some blend of the closely related "state
authorization," "state encouragement," or "state entwinement"
theories.
The "state function" theory is derived from a series of Supreme
Court cases holding private action to be the equivalent of state
action when the state had "delegated" to a private party an activity
which the state normally would perform. The theory encompasses
the so-called "white primary" cases,"' requiring political parties to
comply with antidiscrimination rules in conducting primary elec-
tions, as well as cases holding certain private property to be the
equivalent of public property for the exercise of first amendment
rights.124 Those favoring a restricted state action doctrine would
confine these cases to their facts, explaining them on the basis of
the fundamental rights involved: prevention of the effective disen-
franchisement of blacks and facilitation of the exercise of the first
amendment's "preferred freedoms."'' 2
Regardless of the origin of the theory, courts have utilized the
often expansive language of those state function cases to find state
action in the context of possessory liens. 12 Considering the constitu-
tionality of a landlord's statutorily sanctioned seizure in Hall v.
Garson,127 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that the
Cal. Rptr. 423, 428 (Ct. App. 1974), or to give him tax credit, Sifuentes v. Weed, 525 P.2d
1157 (Colo. 1974), or that such procedure is merely ministerial, cf. id., and serves the public
purpose of orderliness, Kipp v. Cozens, supra. See also Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d.
Cir. 1974).
123. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
124. Amalgamated Food Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (shopping
plaza); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town).
125. See Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, part 1, supra note 111.
126. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Watson v. Branch County
Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla.
1972); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972), reu'd sub nom. Adams v. Southern
Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974); Collins
v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109
(N.D. Cal. 1970); Blye v. Globe-Wemicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347
N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
127. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970). A landlord had seized a tenant's portable television
pursuant to a Texas statute recognizing a lien on the personal property of tenants in favor of
a landlord and authorizing seizure. Id. at 432-33. The district court had dismissed the suit
on the grounds that the civil rights statutes did not confer jurisdiction. See id. at 433-34.
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seizure was "an act that possesses many, if not all, of the character-
istics of an act of the State."'' 2 The court emphasized that since the
execution of a lien traditionally had been the function of a state
officer, the statute vested in the landlord authority normally
exercised by the state.1 2 An innkeeper's execution of his lien simi-
larly was found to constitute state action in Blye v. GlobezWernike
Realty Co.,'" concerning a hotel resident who was locked out of her
room and whose personal property was seized when she fell behind
in rental payments. Despite the innkeeper's argument that the ab-
sence of any participation by a state official in the seizure elimi-
nated the need to afford due process to the resident, the court found
the "state function" test satisfied: "In this State, the execution of
a lien, be it a conventional security interest, a writ of attachment,
or a judgment lien traditionally has been the function of the Sheriff.
On this view, State action can be found in an innkeeper's execution
on his own lien." ' As in Hall, the Blye court focused upon the
seizure aspect of the innkeeper's lien to find state action under the
"state function" theory.
Because the original voluntary surrender associated with repair-
men's and holders' liens avoids actual seizure, however, it has been
suggested that a repairman, warehouseman, or carrier stands less in
the place of a sheriff.112 Sustaining the validity of certain Indiana
statutes"' sanctioning summary detention of a vehicle, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Phillips v. Money' rejected a
finding of state action on all theories, including state function:
"Whenever 'state action' has been found on this 'delegation of state
function' theory, the creditor has actively seized the property, has
entered the dwelling of the debtor, or has been pervasively regulated
128. Id. at 439.
129. Id. The court of appeals remanded Hall to the district court which, in an unreported
memorandum decision, denied the requested injunctive relief and dismissed the complaint.
On a second appeal, the court of appeals relied upon the fact that the statute "authorized"
the challenged conduct in finding that it affronted due process. Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845
(5th Cir. 1972). See notes 140-53 infra & accompanying text for discussion of the state authori-
zation theory of state action.
130. 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
131. Id. at 20, 300 N.E.2d at 713-14, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 175 (citations omitted).
132. Clark & Landers, supra note 1, at 389. But see Note, The Extension of Due Process
Requirements to Lien Enforcement Provisions - The Potential Impact on Iowa Low, 59 IowA
L. REv. 1226, 1239 n.118 (1974).
133. IND. CODE §§ 9-9-5-6, 32-8-31-1, 32-8-31-3, 32-8-31-5 (1971).
134. 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974).
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by the state."' 5 A federal district court in Melara v. Kennedy''8
likewise preserved California warehousemen's liens,"7 reasoning
that they were enforced by means of private or public sales without
state intervention or participation; warehousemen, consequently,
did not exercise a traditional state function. The "state function"
theory of state action apparently has limited applicability to posses-
sory liens because traditionally no governmental action is involved
in liens enforced by the refusal to restore property originally surren-
dered to the lienor. 1 8 Therefore, although the theory should allow
finding state action in the exercise of innkeepers' liens, it does not
support a finding of state action in repairmen's liens or holders'
liens."3 9
A second state action theory employed in possessory lien chal-
lenges evolved from the "authorization" and "encouragement" lan-
guage in a number of Supreme Court decisions. 4 ' "Authorization,"
"encouragement," and "entwinement" appear to be shades of the
same basic concept: when a state creates or recognizes private
rights, state involvement in the enforcement of such rights is suffi-
cient to constitute state action. This second theory draws its great-
est support from the Supreme Court's decision in Reitman v.
Mulkey,"' invalidating an amendment to the California constitu-
tion,' the effect of which was to repeal fair-housing legislation.
135. Id. at 993 (footnotes omitted). The court noted the disagreement among other courts
concerning the persuasiveness of the state function argument as applied to self-help reposses-
sion, landlord's liens, and utility cutoffs, finding the argument unpersuasive as applied to a
repairman's refusal to redeliver. Id.
136. 2 Pov. L. REP. 19,603 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The court denied the right to bring an action
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), to a plaintiff whose goods were
subject to a warehouseman's lien for unpaid storage charges.
137. CAL. COMM. CODE § 7210 (West 1964).
138. See note 31 supra.
139. Nonetheless, it could be argued that traditional participation by a state official is not
a prerequisite of the state function theory. Since the state traditionally reserves to itself the
machinery for resolving disputes, it abdicates a state function to an individual when it allows
a creditor to assert and enforce a lien: "It has been noted that where the creditor is empow-
ered, whether by common law or by statute, to unilaterally resolve a conflict, he is acting
within a sphere reserved for the state alone and, therefore, his power, like state power, must
be fettered by the restraints of due process." Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 747
(2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 329 (1974).
140. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956);
McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914). But cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
141. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
142. CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 26 (1964).
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Despite the contention of the state that the amendment was neutral
regarding racial discrimination, the Supreme Court found that the
amendment authorized private discrimination and "significantly
encourage[d] and involve[d] the State in private discrimina-
tions. '
143
Unless the Reitman state action rationale is confined to racial
discrimination, it appears to support a finding of state action when
a private party employs the statutorily sanctibned possessory lien.1"
Relying primarily upon Reitman, federal district courts in Klim v.
Jones"' and Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp.16 invalidated California
and Illinois innkeepers' lien laws, the operation of which was
entirely extrajudicial; 7 the landlords' private conduct met the state
action requirement because the statutes "encouraged" the con-
duct.148 Statutes creating repairmen's and holders' liens clearly au-
143. 387 U.S. at 381.
144. One court appeared to hold that the enactment of a statute constituted state action,
although a circularity of reasoning detracts from the persuasiveness of the apparent holding.
In Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974), the court said that "direct,
legislative embodiments of the public will, in the form of stafutes, can be similarly considered
actions of the state, even where they codify the common law, when the consequence of the
statute enables private citizens to act in derogation of the Constitution."Id. at 494. The court
found the derogation of the Constitution in the authorization for the garageman to "act in
derogation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Thus, in determining the presence or absence
of state action, without which there is no violation of the fourteenth amendment, the court
relied on the "fact" that the fourteenth amendment was violated.
In its consideration of the validity of the detention provision after a motion to alter and
amend an order, the court misread Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146,
520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974), as finding no state action due to the original voluntary
delivery of possession. 378 F. Supp. at 498. In fact, Adams specifically found state action. 11
Cal. 3d at 153, 520 P.2d at 965,113 Cal. Rptr. at 149. See notes 98-101 supra & accompanying
text. Adams found the garageman's possession significant in finding a property interest in
the garageman and in precluding a finding of debtor deprivation. Id. at 155, 520 P.2d at 966,
113 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
145. 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
146. 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. 1l1. 1972).
147. CAL. CIV. CoDE § 1861 (West Supp. 1974); Iu.. REV. STAT. ch. 71, § 2 (1973); id. ch.
82, § 57.
148. The courts in Klim and Collins went on to find that the statutes were not mere
codifications of rights granted landlords at common law. 338 F. Supp. at 395-96. Klim con-
cluded that enforcement of the Hen was possible solely by virtue of the statute exempting
the landlord from common law liability for conversion, forcible entry, and trespass. 315 F.
Supp. at 114. If the Reitman theory has viability outside the racial context in which it was
developed, the finding that a lien exists solely by virtue of a statute would seem unnecessary
to buttress the state action finding. Commentators indeed have expressed the view that a
law's age or its historical underpinnings are irrelevant for state action purposes. See Burke
& Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Four-
teenth Amendment, 47 So. CAL. L. Rnv. 1, 47, 51-52 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Essay on
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thorize and arguably encourage any deprivation which may result
from their utilization, thereby rendering themselves vulnerable to
the second state action theory. The state's involvement is signifi-
cant in many instances; a state's department of motor vehicles, for
example, frequently transfers title to an automobile after sale pur-
suant to a statutory garageman's lien.' State statutes often estab-
lish priorities between the lienor and other secured creditors or bona
fide purchasers; for example Uniform Commercial Code section 9-
310 sets out such a system of priorities, thereby involving states
which adopt those priorities in the substantive law of creditors'
rights.' 0 Recent commentators have noted: "State law has so occu-
pied the field. . . that public regulation merges indistinguishably
with the private remedy."''
While the Reitman theory offers a. greater possibility for finding
state action than the narrower state- function theory, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the former theory in
Phillips v. Money:15 "[T]he enactment of statutes or recognition
of the common law (permitting retention of possession by a garage-
man for claimed unpaid charges) is not to be deemed affirmative
support such that 'state action' occurs, and the state merely estab-
lishes the legal context in which individuals conduct their private
affairs." ' Courts reviewing extrajudicial creditors' remedies often
the Fourteenth Amendment, part 2]; Note, Procedural Due Process - Post-Fuentes Consti-
tutionality of Garagemen's Liens, 54 B.U.L. REv. 542, 551-52 (1974). See also Cockerel v.
Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491, 494 (W.D. Ky. 1974). Even were such an inquiry relevant, a
common law-statutory dichotomy would add little clarity to the analysis. Courts then would
be required to ascertain what the common law was, whether the statute has changed it, and
if the change is significant enough to constitute state action. See Note, Procedural Due
Process - Post-Fuentes Constitutionality of Garagemen's Liens, 54 B.U.L. Rav. 542, 552
(1974). Such an analysis could lead to the anomalous result of having state action for four-
teenth amendment purposes vary among jurisdictions. See Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendment, part 2, supra, at 47.
149. See note 122 supra.
150. See Clark & Landers, supra note 1, at 388.
151. Id.
152. 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974).
153. Id. at 994 (footnote omitted). In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), where the Supreme Court appeared to retreat
from the expansive state action doctrine previously developed. The Court held in Moose
Lodge that, absent a showing that the regulation was intended overtly or covertly to encour-
age discrimination, a regulatory scheme operated by a state's liquor board did not implicate
the state in a private club's discriminatory guest practice sufficiently to make those practices




fear that since statutes regulate many aspects of purely private
behavior, finding state action in statutes recognizing private reme-
dies "would cast the shadow of state action over all activity,"15' and
that the line between purely private action and state action would
be obliterated were it drawn to include what has been called "pas-
sive state action."15 Although aware of the inherent contradiction
in the "passive action" argument, the courts accepting it are at-
tempting to define state action in a social policy context: if the
purpose of the fourteenth amendment is to prevent misuse of power,
it should encompass an individual wielding power granted by the
state as readily as it encompasses state agents exercising state
power. In the field of constitutional protections, consideration of
social policy may well constitute a more useful analytical tool than
the historical analysis associated with the state function theory.'
The unfounded fear that state action would engulf private action
if such involvement is found in self-help repossession or possessory
liens arises because the issue simply has been stated too broadly.
The question is not whether all conduct sanctioned by statute con-
stitutes state action, but whether characteristics unique to the oper-
ation of certain possessory liens support a finding of state action.
Unjustified interference with possessory rights normally constitutes
the tort of conversion; both conversion actions and due process guar-
antees are meant to protect citizens' possessory rights.57 Conversion
actions prevent the private abuse of power; due process, the public
abuse. Enabling statutes authorize creditor conduct which if pri-
vately done in the absence of sanction could constitute conversion,
and if performed by a state agent would create a fourteenth amend-
ment denial of due process. The issue more precisely stated, there-
fore, is whether creditor enabling statutes are to form a hybrid pro-
cedure immune from attack both as private conversion and due
154. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
95 S. Ct. 325 (1974).
155. See Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 47 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d
Cir. 1974).
156. An approach emphasizing social purpose in definition is not unusual. In resolving the
question of what passes under Bankruptcy Act section 70a(5), 11 U.S.C. § ll0(a)() (1970),
to the trustee in bankruptcy, the Supreme Court adopted a social purpose definition of
property to place accrued vacation pay beyond the trustee's reach. Lines v. Frederick, 400
U.S. 18 (1970).
157. See Rendleman, supra note 44, at 570; cf. McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983:
Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 26-27
(1974).
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process denial. State action must be found to avoid such immuniza-
tion. 158
Procedures Mandated by Due Process
Upon determining that state action159 will cause a deprivation"'0
of a debtor's constitutionally cognizable interest,6 ' courts must
apply procedural due process protections of notice and hearing. 62
158. It has been suggested that a state action finding in the debtor-creditor context is an
attempt to interpose the fourteenth amendment between debtor and creditor, rather than
between citizen and state as contemplated by the amendment. Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendment, part 2, supra note 148, at 54. That statement of the amendment's purpose is
deceiving since it neglects to explain why such a shield was deemed necessary for citizens: a
citizen is helpless against the power of the state. Even Burke and Reber recognize this purpose
of the amendment. Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, part 1, supra note 111, at 1012. To
buttress their arguments against the use of the fourteenth amendment in the debtor-creditor
context, however, they note that the state action limitation "also preserves important institu-
tional interests in federalism, private structuring of relationships, and allocation of responsi-
bility between legislative and judicial branches." Id. Their language must be read carefully.
They do not claim that the fourteenth amendment contemplated those so-called institutional
interests; the Constitution indeed dealt with each of those interests prior to the fourteenth
amendment. The purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to protect the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of power by the state, a purpose which seems to vitiate many of the
arguments advanced by Burke and Reber.
Power is the essential factor in the state action formula. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 93 (1972); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1974) (dissenting
opinion); Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 973 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Gibbs
v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 48 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974). The
creditor enabling statute clothes the creditor with a power which is concurrent with the state's
power. The state action therefore occurs when the power is delegated. Gibbs v. Titelman,
supra at 47-48.
Ironically, the Supreme Court struck down the replevin statutes involved in Fuentes due
to the lack of state participation in the procedure. To prevent misuse, the Court required a
judicial determination before the possessory interest was disturbed. "The statutes, moreover,
abdicate effective state control over state power. Private parties, serving their own private
advantage, may unilaterally invoke state power to replevy goods from another. No state
official reviews the basis for the claim to repossession; and no state official evaluates the need
for immediate seizure. There is not even a requirement that the plaintiff provide any informa-
tion to the court on these matters. The state acts largely in the dark." 407 U.S. at 93
(footnotes omitted). In Fuentes the absence of state participation necessitated relief, while a
technically drawn state action requirement would deny relief in the absence of this participa-
tion.
159. See notes 109-58 supra & accompanying text.
160. See notes 72-108 supra & accompanying text.
161. See notes 48-71 supra & accompanying text.
162. The Supreme Court stated in Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914): "The
fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard." The precise nature of
the hearing required for the protection of debtors has not been specified by the Court. See
Resnick, Consumer Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Preseizure Replevin
Proceedings, 16 Wm. & MARY L. RFv. 269 (1974).
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From its initial treatment in Sniadach until its restraint in Mitchell,
the Supreme Court continuously expanded debtor due process, ex-
tending fourteenth amendment protection to additional types of
debtors and curtailing a number of creditors' summary remedies.
During that expansion, the Fuentes holding seemed to establish an
inflexible requirement for notice and an opportunity for a hearing
before depriving a debtor, even temporarily, of a protected inter-
est."' Because of the apparent inflexibility of the Fuentes prior-
hearing rule"' and the factual similarity of Fuentes and Mitchell,"5
some commentators have interpreted Mitchell as overruling
Fuentes, at least regarding the prior-hearing requirement166 since
Mitchell upheld the Louisiana sequestration procedure partly be-
cause the statute allowed the debtor to seek an immediate postsei-
zure hearing.6 7 This rationale was at odds with the Court's conclu-
sion in Fuentes that a wrong may not be done merely because it can
be undone, 68 the Fuentes conclusion appearing to be an implicit
rejection of postdeprivation hearings. Thus, although Mitchell pur-
163. The Fuentes opinion is replete with references to the necessity of a hearing before
deprivation:
This is no new principle of constitutional law. The right to a prior hearing has
long been recognized by this Court under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amend-
ments. Although the Court has held that due process tolerates variances in the
form of a hearing "appropriate to the nature of the case," and "depending upon
the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent pro-
ceedings [if any]," the Court has traditionally insisted that whatever its form,
opportunity for that hearing must be provided before the deprivation at issue
takes effect.
407 U.S. at 82 (citations omitted). See also Note, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.-The Reposses-
sion of Fuentes, 5 Mmi. ST. U.L. Ry. 74 (1974).
164. Justice Powell noted, when concurring in Mitchell: 'It seems to me, however, that it
was unnecessary for the Fuentes opinion to have adopted so broad and inflexible a rule
.. " 94 S. Ct. at 1908.
165. See note 7 supra.
166. See Note, Changing Concepts of Consumer Due Process in the Supreme Court - The
New Conservative Majority Bids Farewell to Fuentes, 60 IowA L. Rav. 262,284,286-87 (1974);
Comment, Commercial Transactions: The Future of Self-Help Repossession, 8 JoHN MAR-
sHAmL J. PPAC. & PRo. 96, 104 (1974); Note, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant - The Repossession of
Fuentes, 5 Ma. ST. U.L. Ra. 74,87 (1974); 5 Cu mEan n.SAlonn L. Rv. 136,141 (1974).
167. Although a concurring Justice intimated the contrary, 94 S. Ct. at 1909 ("An oppor-
tunity for an adversary hearing must then be accorded promptly... ."), the Court recog-
nized that the postdeprivation hearing in Mitchell was not automatic: "Finally, the debtor
may immediately have a full hearing on the matter of possession following the execution of
the writ... ." Id. at 1901 (emphasis supplied). See also LA. CoDa Crv. PRoc. ANN. art. 3506
(West 1961).
168. 407 U.S. at 84-87.
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ported not to change the law,"9 some contraction of the expansive
due process protection developing in the wake of Fuentes seemed an
inevitable result of the Mitchell decision.'
At the height of the confusion about reconciling Fuentes and
Mitchell,17 ' the Court appeared to compound the uncertainty by
holding Georgia's prejudgment garnishment procedure 72 unconsti-
tutional on the basis of Fuentes. The dissent in North Georgia Fin-
ishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.7 3 criticized the majority for sparse
comparisons and evasion:
The Court once again-for the third time in less than three
years-struggles with what it regards as the due process aspects
of a State's old and long-unattacked commercial statutes de-
signed to afford a way for relief to a creditor against a delinquent
debtor. On this third occasion, the Court, it seems to me, does
little more than make very general and very sparse comparisons
of the present case with Fuentes v. Shevin on the one hand, and
with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. on the other; concludes that
this case resembles Fuentes more than it does Mitchell; and
then strikes down the Georgia statutory structure as offensive of
due process. One gains the impression . . .that the Court is
endeavoring to say as little as possible in explaining just why the
Supreme Court of Georgia is being reversed.'Y
The dissent's criticism of the majority, however, may have indi-
cated an effective reconciliation of Fuentes, Mitchell, and North
Georgia Finishing. Interpreting the Court to say "that this case
resembles Fuentes more than it does Mitchell,"'75 the dissent sug-
gested that the Court was using those cases as reference points on a
169. The Mitchell court anticipated no adverse effect on cases decided in the shadow of
Fuentes. 94 S. Ct. at 1914.
170. The "inevitable contraction" of Fuentes by Mitchell has proven somewhat illusory
following the Court's decision in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct.
719 (1975). See notes 64-67 supra & accompanying text. A separate opinion by Justice Stewart
noted: "It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin seems to
have been greatly exaggerated." 95 S. Ct. at 723 (concurring opinion) (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, Mr. Justice Powell's concurrence viewed the majority's opinion as a resuscitation
of Fuentes and a relegation of Mitchell to its narrow factual setting. Id. at 723-26. See also
notes 173-76 infra & accompanying text.
171. See Note, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant - The Repossession of Fuentes, 5 MFm. ST. U.L.
lav. 74, 82, 89 (1974).
172. GA. CODE Arm. § 46-101 (1974).
173. 95 S. Ct. 719, 726 (1975).




continuum of due process procedural requirements."'
An examination of specific characteristics of different state credi-
tor remedies can determine where the remedy falls on that proce-
dural continuum. The Court in Mitchell provided guidance about
which factors may be relevant to such an inquiry by its focus on the
factors which distinguish that case from Fuentes. While also relying
upon the duality of interests in the liened property, '77 Mitchell fur-
ther distinguished Fuentes by emphasizing the loss of the vendor's
lien upon transfer of the chattel,7 8 Louisiana's requirement that the
creditor allege specific facts,"' the debtor's statutory right to seek
an immediate dissolution hearing,'80 and Orleans Parish's require-
ment that a judge review the allegations.' Taken alone, no one of
those factors seemed sufficient to distinguish Fuentes'2 : the interest
of the installment seller in Fuentes was remarkably similar to that
of the vendor in Mitchell; judicial review of even specific allegations
was of limited due process relevance when the allegations could not
be contradicted prior to the deprivation;"3 despite its immediacy,
the postdeprivation dissolution hearing did not satisfy the require-
ment of a prior hearing. The risk of loss of the vendor's peculiar
interest, when taken with judicial participation in the process, was
sufficient to place the case on the continuum of due process require-
ments short of the Fuentes point requiring a prior hearing, but at a
point requiring an immediate opportunity for a post-deprivation
hearing.
An interpretation of Mitchell and Fuentes as presenting a contin-
uum of due process procedural requirements represents a return to
176. The Mitchell court suggested the existence of a continuum in concluding that
"Fuentes was decided against a factual and legal background sufficiently different from that
now before us. .... 94 S. Ct. at 1904.
177. "With this duality in mind, we are convinced that the Louisiana sequestration proce-
dure is not invalid, either on its face or as applied." Id. at 1899.
178. Id. at 1900.01.
179. Id. at 1904.
180. Id. at 1901.
181. Id. at 1904. A number of courts have regarded judicial participation as the factor
distinguishing Fuentes and Mitchell. See Turner v. Impala Motors, 508 F.2d 607, 610 (6th
Cir. 1974); Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945, 971 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Garcia
v. Krause, 380 F. Supp. 1254, 1258-59 (S.D. Tex. 1974); Woods v. Tennessee, 378 F. Supp.
1364, 1366 (S.D. Tenn. 1974); Jones v. Banner Moving & Storage Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 726, 358
N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
182. In his dissent in Mitchell, Mr. Justice Stewart points out that insufficiency. Id. at
1910-14 (dissenting opinion).
183. Id. at 1912 (dissenting opinion).
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a flexible due process standard"4 under which courts can analyze
separately various creditor remedies. Fuentes itself can be placed in
the mainstream of that flexible approach, for despite its insistence
upon a prior hearing, Fuentes stated the issue for its consideration
to be "whether procedural due process in the context of these cases
requires an opportunity for a hearing before the State authorizes its
agents to seize property in the possession of a person upon the appli-
cation of another." ' North Georgia Finishing similarly falls on the
continuum of due process procedural requirements under that flexi-
ble approach. A number of the Mitchell factors were absent in that
case 88 and its place on the continuum consequently was nearer
Fuentes, at a point requiring a prior hearing.' Determination of due
process requirements, therefore, depends on the "mix" of factors
necessary' 8 to allow a postdeprivation hearing and on the peculiari-
ties of particular possessory lien statutes.
PROSPECTUS
The continuing uncertainty surrounding both the analysis of the
Mitchell decision and the scope of the state action doctrine'89 ren-
184. "The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures univer-
sally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886,895 (1961). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972); Inland Empire Dist.
Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 710 (1945); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333,
351 (1938).
185. 407 U.S. at 80 (first emphasis supplied).
186. 95 S. Ct. at 722-23. See note 66 supra.
187. While relying on Fuentes for its decision in North Georgia Finishing, the Court sought
to avoid the impression of returning to a mechanical prior-hearing rule and couched the due
process requirement in terms of "opportunity for an early hearing." 95 S. Ct. at 722 (emphasis
supplied). Precisely what that language was intended to mean is unclear. The Court's
discussion of Sniadach and Fuentes seemed to imply that a hearing prior to the taking would
be required. rd. In distinguishing the facts of Mitchell, however, the Court pointed out that
the Georgia statute made no provision for a hearing following deprivation, absent payment
of a bond. Id. at 723. While it might be argued that the bourt's choice of language in North
Georgia Finishing indicated that an early, rather than prior, hearing would in all
circumstances be sufficient to fulfill the requirements of due process, the Court's reaffirma-
tion of Sniadach and Fuentes seemed to negate that interpretation. Nonetheless, the discus-
sion of those latter two cases in North Georgia Finishing omitted any specific reference to
the requirement of a prior hearing clearly set out in the original cases. See id. at 722.
188. See Comment, Commercial Transactions: The Future of Self-Help Repossession, 8
JOHN MARSHALL J. PR~c. & Pnoc. 96, 103 (1974); Note, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.-The
Repossession of Fuentes, 5 MEm. ST. U.L. Ray. 74, 87-88 (1974).
189. The direction the Court will take on the state action question is difficult to predict.
With lower courts waiting for guidance, the Court recently denied certiorari to a trio of cases
which might have illuminated the issue. Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.),
1004
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ders uncertain any conclusion about the future of the various posses-
sory liens. The elements of the due process guarantee suggest that
possessory liens are vulnerable to constitutional challenges in vary-
ing degrees with gradations necessitating separate judicial analyses.
Innkeepers' liens probably will continue to fall to fourteenth
amendment challenges. The lack of original surrender of possession
necessitates a seizure,' 0 and a state action finding usually can be
premised upon the state function theory; ' this same absence of
surrender of possession to the lienor prevents the application of the
preserve-the-status-quo approach to defeat a finding of debtor dep-
rivation.1 2 Further, the landlord-tenant relationship would not
seem to provide a basis for finding dual interest, ' whether the
Mitchell dual-interest criterion speaks to the presence of a.constitu-
tionally cognizable interest and the need for due process,' 4 or
whether dual interest is merely one of the multiple factors to be
considered in assessing the procedural requirements of due pro-
cess."'5 Therefore, because innkeepers' liens employ state action to
deprive an individual of a constitutionally cognizable interest, due
process protections are mandated.
Repairmen's and holders' liens appear more immune from due
process attack, the former more so than the latter. Both involve an
cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 329 (1974); Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974); Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, 426 F.2d 16
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 328 (1974). Although a decision by the Court in those cases
would have aided the state action analysis for possessory Hens, it may not have been determi-
native. Those cases involved challenges to self-help repossession undertaken pursuant to the
Uniform Commercial Code. In Adams the appeal maintained that the California statutory
scheme conferred both judicial and police power on the secured creditor and that when the
state abdicated such functions they retained the characteristics of an act of the state. Adams
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, No. 73-1842 (U.S., filed June 7, 1974), cert. denied, 95 S.
Ct. 325 (1974). See 2 Pov. L. REP. 16,023 (1974). In Vowlin the petitioner argued that the
statutory scheme delegated the power of the state to private parties, insisting that such ex
parte procedure violated the most basic concept of due process. Nowlin v. Professional Auto
Sales, No. 73-1897 (U.S., filed June 19, 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 328 (1974). See 2POV.
L. REP. 1 16,025 (1974). Speculation about the Court's direction, however, cannot overlook
the fact that the two most recent appointees, Justices Powell and Rehnquist, voted with the
six-person majority in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), a case generally
thought to be a step backward from the expansive state action doctrine developed in the equal
protection cases. See note 153 supra & accompanying text.
190. See notes 107-08 supra & accompanying text.
191. See notes 123-39 supra & accompanying text.
192. See notes 106-08 supra & accompanying text.
193. See text following note 71 supra.
194. See notes 53-71 supra & accompanying text.
195. See notes 177-88 supra & accompanying text.
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original voluntary surrender of possession by the debtor,"' rendering
the state function theory of state action unavailable."9 ' It has been
contended, however, that courts should define state action to in-
clude lesser degrees of governmental involvement than a state
function;'98 such a broadened definition would encompass many
possessory liens in which possession is surrendered. The surrender
of possession not only impedes a finding of state action, but also
may prevent a finding of debtor deprivation because of the recently
developed approach emphasizing the preservation of the status
quo. "9 Moreover, if Mitchell's dual-interest concept speaks to the
presence of a constitutionally cognizable interest, the repairman's
peculiar interest in the property may be analogous to that of the
Louisiana vendor, thereby overcoming the finding of a protected
interest in the debtor. 0
It has been contended, however, that the interest of the carrier or
warehouseman should not rise to the status of a protected dual
interest.70' If the duality of interests is merely a factor determining
the procedural requirements of due process, repairmen's liens in-
volve a peculiar risk of loss which suggests the sufficiency of an
immediate postdeprivation hearing, but the lien's procedural suffi-
ciency will depend upon what combination of the Mitchell factors,
including judicial participation, must be present to allow the substi-
tution of a postdeprivation hearing for a predeprivation hearing.2 2
Apparently lacking a dual interest, holders' liens would not seem to
allow a postdeprivation hearing if due process is required in the
enforcement of such liens.
Mitchell indicated the need for separate analyses of the due pro-
cess requirements of creditor remedies and, taken with Fuentes and
North Georgia Finishing, presented a flexible due process standard.
Under that standard debtor due process requirements form a con-
tinuum, upon which each possessory lien lies. The placement of a
particular possessory lien upon the continuum varies according to
the specific characteristics of different liens. While the continuum
196. See notes 74-108 supra & accompanying text.
197. See notes 132.39 supra & accompanying text.
198. See notes 144-58 supra & accompanying text.
199. See notes 98-106 supra & accompanying text.
200. See notes 68-69 supra & accompanying text.
201. See notes 70-71 supra & accompanying text.
202. See notes 177-88 supra & accompanying text.
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creates a general reference, the three Supreme Court decisions pro-
vide little specific guidance for locating other remedies on the con-
tinuum. The Court's continuing examination of closely related con-
stitutional issues, moreover, permits uncertainties to remain, the
resolution of which may determine the fate of particular possessory
liens. The breadth of the state action doctrine remains unclear, the
effect of voluntary surrender of possession on the deprivation ele-
ment has created conflict, and the concept of a dual debtor-creditor
interest may speak to the existence of a constitutionally cognizable
interest in finding that due process protections attach or may ad-
dress the form of procedural due process required after the finding
that those protections attach. Because of the number of unresolved
variables which may determine the specific due process require-
ments of each remedy, courts should move quickly to crystallize the
evolving debtor-creditor due process law into a predictable body of
law upon which both debtors and creditors can rely in ordering their
affairs.
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